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The Effect of REFIT on Irish Electricity Prices 
 
1. Introduction 
The promotion of renewable energy resources has increased recently in response to 
more stringent European legislation and greater environmental awareness. In 2009 the 
European Commission approved the 20-20-20 plan. One of the goals is that 20 per 
cent of all energy use in the European Union comes from renewable resources by 
2020. For Ireland this has translated into a requirement that renewables provide 16 per 
cent of total energy demand by 2020. Most of the responsibility of meeting this target 
will fall on electricity generation, given the limited renewable resources available to 
fuel other sectors such as heating and transport (the focus on renewable resources in 
electricity generation applies to other countries as well, such as the UK; see Newbery, 
2010). The renewable energy target is legally binding, and should Ireland not achieve 
this target domestically, it will have to pay for the statistical transfer of renewable 
energy from another member state.  
 
In order to reach the 16 per cent economy-wide target, the power sector will have to 
generate about 40 per cent of electricity demand using renewable resources, primarily 
wind. This target is consistent with Irish government plans, as set out in 2007 
(DCMNR 2007) and amended in 2008 (DEHLG, 2008). The method chosen to 
incentivise investment in renewable electricity generation is a system of support 
payments. The cost of the scheme is then passed on to Irish consumers in the form of 
a Public Service Obligation (PSO) levy. 
 
The price of electricity is important to consumers and policy makers. There have been 
extensive discussions of the price of electricity during the past couple of decades. 
There is concern about how it affects residential consumers (and energy poverty) and 
the competitiveness of exporting companies (for recent examples see SEI 2010 and 
Diffney et al. 2010). This paper estimates how the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff 
scheme (REFIT) influences electricity prices in 2020. We compare the cost of 
electricity for different levels of renewable generation as fossil fuel prices change. 
Note that the PSO in Ireland includes not only payments for renewable energy, but 
also payments to peat generating plants and plants that were built to maintain 
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electricity reliability standards. This paper will focus exclusively on payments related 
to renewable generation. We calculate the cost of REFIT for 2020 and find that the 
effect of the scheme depends greatly on exogenous factors such as the price of fossil 
fuels. When prices are high the scheme is less costly, adding up to 6.8 per cent to 
wholesale electricity costs. On the other hand when fuel prices are low, the wholesale 
price of electricity can be raised by up to 17.2 per cent due to the REFIT scheme. 
 
Previous research shows that wind generation can be used to hedge against high fossil 
fuel prices (Berry 2005; Diffney et al. 2009). Graves and Litvinova (2009) find that 
the hedging properties tend to be more valuable in the long run, when financial 
hedges are unlikely to be available.1 The work undertaken in this paper shows that the 
REFIT scheme maintains renewables’ hedging properties when it passes the cost on to 
consumers, although it is somewhat dampened. 
 
Section 2 introduces the renewable support scheme and describes how it works. 
Section 3 presents the model used for the analysis and outlines the main assumptions 
used in the simulations. Given the uncertainty that exists in energy markets we 
provide the results for a series of fuel price scenarios. Section 4 presents the results of 
the simulation. Finally, Section 5 summarises the results and concludes. 
2. REFIT scheme 
In the Republic of Ireland, investment in new renewable electricity generation is 
supported by the Renewable Energy Feed-In Tariff (REFIT) scheme, which 
guarantees a minimum price for renewable electricity to investors. This scheme 
replaces the Alternative Energy Requirement scheme (AER).2 The first phase of 
REFIT was announced in 2006 and provides support for wind generation, hydro and 
biomass for up to 15 years. The level of support increases with inflation (measured by 
the Consumer Price Index) if inflation is positive. 
 
                                                 
1 The authors also conclude that in areas where wind does not blow at times of peak demand (for 
example areas where the annual peak coincides with extensive use of air conditioning) hedging through 
renewable resources will only be economic if fossil fuel prices are expected to be high. 
2 The AER accounted for about 532MW of wind investment support, designed to last 15 year. The last 
round of competitive tendering under the AER took place in 2005. 
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Table 1 shows the amounts for all categories for 2006 and 2010, where the 2010 
figures are equal to the 2006 figures adjusted for inflation.3 The REFIT payment is 
composed of three parts. The first part is independent of the market price of 
electricity. In Table 1 it is defined as “Fixed Payment” and is paid for each 
MegaWatt-hour (MWh) of electricity produced by generators. The second part is a 
reference price (equal to €66.35/MWh in 2010). If the price obtained on the market is 
smaller than the reference price, a payment is made for the difference between the 
two. Finally the third part is the technology difference payment, paid in addition to the 
reference price for all renewables other than large scale wind. Large scale wind refers 
to any wind farm with an installed capacity larger than 5 MegaWatt (MW). 
 
In Table 1 the “Guaranteed Price” is the sum of the reference price and the technology 
difference payment for all technologies. For renewable generators that fall within the 
first phase of REFIT (from now on referred to as REFIT I), the technology difference 
payment is paid independently of the market price. 
 
Table 1. Level of support for renewables in REFIT I, €/MWh 
 2006  2010 
 Fixed payment Guaranteed 
price 
 Fixed payment Guaranteed 
price 
Large scale wind 
All receive  
15% of  57 
 
57  
All receive 
15% of 66.353 
 
66.353 
Small scale wind 59  68.681 
Hydro 72  83.814 
Biomass -LFG 70  81.486 
Biomass - other 72  83.814 
Source: DCMNR (2006) and DCENR (2009) 
www.dcenr.gov.ie/Energy/Sustainable+and+Renewable+Energy+Division 
 
In 2009 the Department for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources extended 
the support to additional categories of renewable generation (DCENR 2009). We refer 
to the second phase of the scheme as REFIT II. Support prices for bio-energy were 
subsequently revised, raising the price level for smaller generating units and lowering 
it for non-CHP anaerobic digestion.  
 
                                                 
3 The adjustment is upwards only, so guaranteed prices did not decline following the negative CPI in 
2009. 
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Table 2. Support for renewables in REFIT II, €/MWh 
 2010 
 Fixed payment  Guaranteed price 
Off-shore wind* 
All receive 
15% of 66.353 
 
140 
Wave and Tidal* 220 
Anaerobic Digestion CHP 
≤500kW  
150 
Anaerobic Digestion CHP 
>500kW 130 
Anaerobic Digestion non-CHP 
≤500kW  
110 
Anaerobic Digestion non-CHP 
>500kW 100 
Biomass CHP ≤1500kW 
 
140 
Biomass CHP >1500kW 120 
* Off-shore wind and wave and tidal energy support prices are not linked to CPI. 
 
Table 2 reports the level of support suggested for REFIT II. The payment is again 
made of three parts. The fixed payment is identical to REFIT I and is equal to 15% of 
the support per MWh given to large scale on-shore wind installations. The reference 
price for REFIT II is higher than the price given to any technology in REFIT I. In 
addition there is the technology difference payment which varies by renewable 
resource. The sum of reference price and the technology payment is reported in Table 
2 as “Guaranteed Payment”. 
 
There are a couple of significant differences between REFIT I and REFIT II, in 
addition to the different prices. First of all the guaranteed prices in REFIT II for off-
shore wind, wave and tidal energy are not indexed to the CPI, so their real value 
decrease over time in line with inflation. Biomass support prices are indexed to CPI. 
In addition in REFIT I the technology difference payment is paid independently of the 
market price, whereas in REFIT II it is not paid if the market price is high enough.  
 
The scheme allocates the payments through a somewhat complicated procedure. Due 
to historic circumstances, the money does not go directly to renewable generators, but 
instead to supply companies who have entered into long term contracts with the 
generators. In 2006 the electricity market in Ireland worked on the basis of bilateral 
contracts between generators and suppliers to final consumers. Generators had to put 
in place 15 year agreements with suppliers (called Purchasing Power Agreements or 
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PPAs). The payment therefore was set up to go to the companies supplying final 
consumers, to compensate them for the difference in cost between buying from 
renewable generators and buying from conventional generators. Since the advent of 
the Single Electricity Market (SEM) in November 2007, the Irish electricity market 
has moved away from bilateral contracts. 
 
The SEM is a wholesale market that encompasses both the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. It is structured as a compulsory pool market with capacity 
payments. All generators (with an installed capacity larger than 10MW) must bid their 
short run costs into the pool.4 In general, in each period generators are ranked 
according to their bid and the cheapest plants needed to meet demand are dispatched. 
As an exception to this rule, a small number of plants have been designated priority 
dispatch generators, and are chosen to generate regardless of their bid. Every 
generator producing electricity during the period receives the bid of the marginal plant 
(i.e. the most expensive plant needed to meet demand). In addition generators receive 
capacity payments, designed to remunerate them for their capital investment and 
thereby cover their long run costs. 
 
The change in market structure eliminated bilateral contracts between generators and 
suppliers for all generators with a capacity larger than 10MW. The REFIT program, 
however, still requires these bilateral contracts and is set up to compensate what is 
essentially now a middleman: the supplier to final consumers. The middleman is 
delegated to bid the power generated by the renewable generator into the pool. 
 
In practice therefore the middleman or supplier enters into a PPA with the renewable 
generator, generally for 15 years, the length of time the REFIT will be paid for. The 
agreement specifies the amount that the supplier will pay the generator for each unit 
of electricity produced. Over the course of a year the generator using renewable 
technology r produces er MWhs and receives the amount per MWh negotiated in the 
PPA. The supplier pays the price agreed in the PPA and receives the wholesale price 
Wh achieved in the market in the half hour of generation, and the three components of 
REFIT for each MWh of er. The guaranteed price components of REFIT are 
                                                 
4 Generators with an installed capacity smaller than 10 MW have the option of bidding in the pool or 
operating outside of the market with bilateral agreements. 
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calculated using the average wholesale price per MWh received by the supplier over 
the course of the year, Wave.  
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Equation 1 shows how the fixed payment F is calculated: ܲோாிூ்಺ is the REFIT I 
reference price, or the reference price in the first phase of REFIT. As mentioned 
above, the fixed payment per unit of renewable energy is independent of the market 
price. 
 
Equation 2 calculates ME, the market equalisation payment: if the average wholesale 
market price Wave is smaller than the reference price ܲோாிூ்ೕ (where j indexes either I 
or II, the first and second phase respectively), the supplier receives the difference 
between the two prices. 
 
Finally the technology difference payment TDr depends on the REFIT phase. 
Equation 3.a. shows that for technologies that fall under REFIT I, it is independent of 
the market price. It only depends on PPPA, the price per MWh specified in the contract 
between generator and supplier; Gr the relevant technology reference price for each 
generation type r; and the appropriate REFIT reference price. For technologies that 
fall under REFIT II, the technology payment also depends on the average wholesale 
price Wave. As the market price increases, any additional payment to the supplier 
decreases. 
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The PPA price will depend on the negotiating power of the generator and the supplier. 
In practice it is unlikely that the PPA price would be lower than the technology-
specific reference price Gr. Even when Gr= PPPA the supplier still receives the fixed 
payment and any positive difference between the market price and the guaranteed 
price, unless any or all of this amount is negotiated away by the generator. 
  
Summarising, the total yearly REFIT payment paid to a supplier who has entered into 
PPA i with a generator using technology r can be defined as: 
ܴܧܨܫ ௜ܶ
௥ ൌ ሺܨ ൅ ܶܦ௥ ൅ ܯܧሻ݁௜
௥ 
 
 
where F, ME and TDr are described in equations 1-3 above, ei is the amount of 
electricity produced under PPA i in the given year, and r indexes the technology. 
 
The formal need for a PPA in the REFIT scheme does not affect the amount that 
consumers eventually have to pay, but it does influence the returns to generators. The 
contract terms in the PPAs will depend on their negotiating power vis-à-vis the 
supplier. There is evidence that some generators have set up a new company that sells 
exclusively to their plant in order to avoid negotiating with independent (and possibly 
powerful) suppliers.5 This set up increases transaction costs (either by the cost of 
setting up the company or by the cost of negotiating with limited power with a 
supplier). 
 
The cost of the scheme is then passed on to Irish consumers in the form of a Public 
Service Obligation (PSO) payment.  The PSO levy is charged to all electricity 
customers as an additional cost in the electricity bill. The PSO is used to compensate 
suppliers for additional costs incurred not only as a result of supporting renewable 
electricity sources, but also indigenous fuels (mostly peat) (CER 2010). In this paper 
we limit our attention to PSO payments related to renewable sources. 
 
  
                                                 
5 The Statutory Instrument 444 of 2009 (http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2009/en/si/0444.html) shows 
several instances where the generator and the supplier share very similar names. This is the case for 
many small scale wind farms, but also for a few large scale ones. 
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3. Model and assumptions 
 
We calculate the cost of REFIT for 2020. The year 2020 is chosen because it is both 
far enough to allow for the deployment of significant additional infrastructure, and 
close enough that the majority of exiting thermal plants are expected to still be 
operating. Moreover, there are well-defined targets for renewable energy in 2020. 
 
Section 2 explains why defining the wholesale electricity price in each half hour of 
the year is necessary to measure the total cost of REFIT. We use IDEM, the Irish 
optimal Dispatch of Electricity Model, to determine the wholesale price. This model 
stacks all the plants in the All-Island market according to their bid price in each half 
hour to build a merit order curve, such as the one displayed in Figure 1, which builds 
the merit curve for the All-Island market and reflects fuel prices at the end of 2007.6 
The merit order varies as fuel prices or the cost of carbon change. If coal becomes 
more expensive than natural gas, coal plants will tend to be dispatched after natural 
gas plants and will move to the right in Figure 1. Wind generation is assumed to have 
a bid price of 0, since wind itself is free. Electricity demand is exogenous, which is 
equivalent to saying that it does not change in response to electricity price changes.  
 
Figure 1. Merit order dispatch curve for the island of Ireland, end of 2007 
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6 At the end of 2007 the price of carbon in the EU Emissions Trading System was essentially 0. 
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IDEM determines the least costly way to meet demand in each half hour. The most 
expensive plant needed to meet demand sets the marginal price, which is paid out to 
all generators producing electricity during that period. The marginal price essentially 
reflects the cost of fuel and carbon needed to generate the last MWh of electricity. 
 
Since wind generation is assumed to have a short run cost of 0, more wind tends to 
put downward pressure on electricity prices, up to a point. Wind generation is by its 
own nature variable. When wind dies down thermal plants (typically fuelled by 
natural gas or coal) must be available to pick up the slack in order to maintain a 
reliable electricity system. It takes several hours for a thermal plant to warm up to the 
point where it can generate electricity. To take this feature into account, we assume 
that a certain number of thermal plants must always be on at their minimum stable 
capacity. The number of plants that are constrained on depends on the time of the year 
and the level of electricity demand and is determined on a monthly basis by the 
model. When thermal plants are constrained on and would not otherwise have been 
dispatched by the market, they do not bid their marginal cost into the market; rather, 
they are compensated for this generation through constraint payments which equal 
their marginal cost, regardless of market prices. At times the need to constrain on 
thermal plants might also cause the curtailment of available wind generation. In this 
study, to avoid unrealistic cycling of the Moneypoint coal plants in the medium fuel 
price scenario, we force the model to adopt the same constrained-on thermal plants as 
in the high fuel price scenario. 
 
Ireland is connected to Great Britain by an existing electricity cable between Northern 
Ireland and Scotland. In addition, contracts have been signed for the building of an 
East-West Interconnector between Ireland and Wales. In this study we assume that 
there will be a further interconnector in place by 2020, bringing the total electrical 
connection between Ireland and Great Britain to 1400MW. Without this additional 
interconnection wind generation would have to be curtailed in order to allow baseload 
thermal plants to run and maintain a reliable electricity system (Diffney et al., 2009).  
 
In calculating the total REFIT payments we make several simplifying assumptions. 
First of all we assume that all REFIT I payments go to large scale wind. Wind 
represents about 99 per cent of all generation in REFIT I and large scale wind 
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accounts for about 90 per cent of wind generation.7  Second, for REFIT II we focus 
on changes in off-shore wind and ocean energy capacity. Third, we avoid having to 
estimate the negotiating power of generators and suppliers by assuming that there is a 
single generator/supplier unit that receives the REFIT payment. This does not affect 
the REFIT cost to consumers. 
 
These assumptions allow us to simplify the calculation of the REFIT payment system. 
The only prices that remain relevant are the wholesale price of electricity and the 
REFIT prices relevant to each technology.  
 
The market equalisation payment from equation 2 and the technology difference 
payments described in equations 3.a and 3.b in section 2 can be combined into one 
equation: 
 
4.  ⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ≥⋅−=
otherwise
WGifeWG
 GPay ave
rr
ave
r
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GPayr is the guaranteed payment to technology r, and the wholesale price per MWh 
for half-hour h, W , is defined as follows:  h
5. ௛ܹ ൌ ܵܯ ௛ܲ ൅ ܥܽ݌ܲܽݕ௛ ൅ ܥ݋݊ݏݐݎܲܽݕ௛ 
 
 
SMP is the System Marginal Price, determined in the pool market. CapPay represents 
Capacity payments to renewable generation, based on the amount of electricity 
generated by these plants. Additionally, if wind or wave generators are curtailed at 
any time (for example to allow thermal plants to continue generating at their 
minimum stable capacity) they receive constraint payments ConstrPay, based on the 
amount they would have generated had they not been constrained. 
 
The total cost of REFIT depends on many factors, but the most prominent are the 
actual amount of renewables on the system, and the price of fossil fuels and carbon 
dioxide permits. To evaluate the cost of REFIT to final consumers we consider two 
different levels of wind penetration on the Island of Ireland for the year 2020: 
2000MW or 6000MW of wind. 2000MW of on-shore wind are likely to be reached 
                                                 
7 Volumes are calculated on the basis of the description of renewable generators in Schedule 3 of the 
Statutory Instrument 444 of 2009 (http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/2009/en/si/0444.html). 
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without any further incentives, so this scenario can be interpreted as a baseline. 
6000MW of wind are likely to be sufficient to meet the target of generating 40 per 
cent of all electricity from renewable sources, as set out in DCMNR (2007) and 
modified by the Carbon Budget (DEHLG, 2009). In addition, we analyse a scenario 
using the wind, wave and tidal generation portfolio outlined in Ireland’s National 
Renewable Energy Action Plan (NREAP, 2010). The plan suggests generation 
capacity for Ireland (excluding Northern Ireland) of 4094MW of on-shore wind, 
555MW of off-shore wind, and 75MW wave capacity. For this study, we increase on-
shore wind capacity in Northern Ireland proportionately to increases in Ireland, after 
the horizon of the Eirgrid Generation Adequacy Report (Eirgrid 2009). Including this 
on-shore wind capacity for Northern Ireland increases total on-shore wind capacity in 
this scenario to 6034MW. We abstract from payments to small scale wind, biomass 
and hydro in 2020. This is clearly a simplification, although the effect of these 
renewable technologies on REFIT payments is likely to be much smaller than the 
combined effect of wind and ocean energy.8 
 
Table 3 summarises the assumptions for the different scenarios in 2020, 
distinguishing between the amount of renewables on the island as a whole and in the 
Republic of Ireland. 
 
Table 3. Renewable scenarios, installed capacity (MW) in 2020 
 All-Island 
on-shore 
wind 
Rep. of Ireland 
on-shore wind 
Rep. of Ireland 
off-shore wind 
Rep. of Ireland 
Wave & Tidal 
1. Low wind 2000 1357 -- -- 
2. High wind 6000 4071 -- -- 
3. High mixed 
renewables 6034 4094 555 75 
 
The installed capacity reported in Table 3 includes the capacity of windfarms that fall 
under a previous AER scheme, although the AER capacity is excluded from the 
calculation of REFIT payments. The AER supported 532MW of investment in wind 
power. Towards the end of 2009 there were 1167MW of wind in the Republic of 
                                                 
8 There is little additional development expected in future years for hydro generation. Biomass 
generation on the other hand may increase significantly over time, especially if more fossil-fuelled 
plants move to cofiring with biomass. However, the scale of biomass penetration is likely to be much 
smaller than wind in Ireland. 
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Ireland, 237MW of hydro (most of it installed decades ago) and 34MW of biomass 
capacity (EirGrid 2009). 
 
We assume that electricity demand growth in the Republic of Ireland averages 0.8 per 
cent per year, in line with the World Recovery scenario from Bergin et al. (2009).  
 
Table 4 outlines the assumptions on fuel prices. We report the price of oil mainly for 
reference purposes. Its level has limited direct effect on the Irish electricity system, 
but we assume that the price of natural gas is linked to oil prices. Most of the Irish 
plants run on natural gas (in 2008 it fuelled 55 per cent of generation; see SEI, 2009). 
The price of coal is less volatile and we assume it is constant across the different fuel 
scenarios. 
 
Table 4.  Fuel price assumptions for 2020,  measured in 2008 currency 
 Low fuel price Medium fuel price High fuel price 
Oil ($/barrel) 57 87 107 
Natural gas (€/MWh) 
 17 26 32 
Coal (€/MWh) 10.2 10.2 10.2 
 
The cost of carbon dioxide permits traded in the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme is set at €30/tonne of CO2, measured in 2008 currency. 
 
We assume that on-shore wind has an average (ex-ante) load factor of 33 per cent at 
installed capacity of 2000MW (1357MW in the Republic of Ireland, referred to as 
ROI from now on). This is equivalent to saying that it can achieve electricity output in 
line with its stated capacity about a third of the time during a year. This load factor 
reduces to 30% at 6000MW (4071MW ROI) as optimal windfarm locations are used. 
The load factor for off-shore wind is set at 35 per cent reflecting the fact that wind 
tends to blow more off-shore. The same factor of 35 per cent is set for wave and tidal. 
The historic wind profile for Ireland for 2008 is used to simulate wind generation in 
this study. Over 2005 to 2008, the wind load has varied between 29 per cent and 33 
per cent (EirGrid 2009). We normalise the wind profile to have a 31 per cent load. 
 
For lack of better data on the load curves of off-shore wind, wave and tidal, we 
assume that on-shore wind, off-shore wind and wave and tidal are perfectly 
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correlated, so that when on-shore wind dies down, so do the other options. If we 
allowed off-shore wind, wave and tidal to generate electricity at different times than 
on-shore wind, we would expect a slightly lower system marginal price in the market 
with the ‘mixed renewables’ option. This would be potentially accompanied by 
somewhat higher REFIT payments if curtailment of renewable generation were more 
limited. The net effect is uncertain, but we do not expect it to deviate significantly 
from the numbers presented here.  
 
We assume an inflation rate of 2 per cent per year going forward. An assumption on 
inflation is necessary to determine the guaranteed price that applies to REFIT II 
renewables in 2020. 
 
Table 5. Level of support in 2020, measured in 2020 and 2008 prices, €/MWh 
REFIT II Guaranteed price 2020 prices 2008 prices 
Off-shore wind 140 108.2 
Wave & Tidal 220 170.0 
 
4. Results 
 
The cost of REFIT is calculated for all the wind, wave and tidal renewables installed 
in the Republic of Ireland. Renewable generation located in Northern Ireland provides 
electricity within the same All-Island market, but is subject to a separate renewable 
support scheme.9 
 
Table 6 shows how REFIT affects the cost of electricity in 2020 when fuel prices are 
at their medium level (corresponding to €26/MWh for natural gas in 2008 currency). 
It compares the cost of the REFIT scheme for three different scenarios. In the first 
column there are 2000MW of wind island-wide, of which 1357MW in the Republic of 
Ireland. Of these 1357MW, 825MW are supported through the REFIT scheme (the 
remaining 532MW fall under the previous AER scheme). The second column reports 
the case where there are 6000MW of on-shore wind on an all island basis, of which 
4071MW in the Republic of Ireland (3539MW in REFIT). Finally the last set of four 
                                                 
9 Renewables in Northern Ireland are supported by NIRO (Northern Ireland Renewable Obligations), 
which is tied to the system of Renewable Obligation Certificates in Great Britain. 
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columns disaggregates the cost of having a mixed portfolio of renewables by 
renewable technology. In this case there are 6664MW of renewables on the island as a 
whole and 4724MW in the Republic of Ireland. REFIT supports 3562MW of the 
4094MW of on-shore wind in this scenario. Fixed payments for the amount of 
capacity subject to REFIT are calculated as shown in Equation 1. The payments that 
depend on guaranteed prices are calculated as shown in Equation 4 and summed over 
the different existing technologies. 
 
Not surprisingly, as more renewables get on the system their cost in terms of REFIT 
increases. Note that the REFIT cost increases a bit less than the increase in installed 
capacity. When a lot of wind is deployed, a small proportion of it is curtailed to allow 
a few thermal plants to generate and therefore maintain reliability of the system. 
 
Table 6. REFIT costs in 2020 (€ million, 2008 currency), medium fuel price 
  All on-shore  Mixed portfolio 
All-Island capacity 2000MW 6000MW   6664MW   
ROI capacity 1357MW 4071MW  On-shore 
(4094MW)
Off-shore 
(555MW)
Wave & Tidal 
(75MW) 
Total 
REFIT capacity 825MW 3539MW  3562MW 555MW 75MW  
Fixed payment  22.8 88.0  90.0 15.8 2.1 108.0 
Guaranteed price 
payment 
- 42.0  - 73.4 23.8 115.1 
Total 
22.8 130.0  90 89.2 25.9 205.2 
Total: €/MWh 
consumed  
0.74 
 
4.25 
 
 2.94 2.92 0.85 6.70 
 
For medium fuel prices, on-shore wind receives the bulk of its REFIT compensation 
from the fixed payment portion of the scheme. The guaranteed price is often below 
the estimated market price, contributing very little to on-shore wind compensation. 
Also note that as more wind is deployed, the average price of electricity decreases. 
Wind has very low variable costs of electricity generation, due to wind being free in 
and of itself. This means that when more wind generation is available, it displaces 
more expensive thermal power and therefore on average decreases the cost of 
electricity in each half hour. Off-shore wind, wave and tidal receive a far greater 
proportion of their compensation from the guaranteed price portion of the scheme.  
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Table 7. REFIT costs in 2020 (€ million, 2008 currency), low fuel price 
  All on-shore  Mixed portfolio 
All-Island capacity 2000MW 6000MW   6664MW   
ROI capacity 1357MW 4071MW  On-shore 
(4094MW)
Off-shore 
(555MW) 
Wave & Tidal 
(75MW) 
Total 
REFIT capacity 825MW 3539MW  3562MW 555MW 75MW  
Fixed payment  22.8 87.4  89.9 15.8 2.1 107.9 
Guaranteed price 
payment 
26.4 123.9  123.7 95.3 26.7 245.7 
Total 49.2 211.3  213.7 111.1 28.8 353.6 
Total: €/MWh 
consumed  
1.61 6.90  6.98 3.63 0.94 11.55 
 
When the price of fuel decreases, the price of electricity in the Single Electricity 
Market also decreases and the cost of REFIT increases for all options, as shown in 
Table 7. 
 
Conversely when the fuel price increases, the cost of REFIT decreases, although 
because of the effect of the fixed payment, the reduction is less than proportional to 
the increase in the SMP. The exception is the case with low wind generation capacity 
installed; here the low levels of ‘free’ wind generation do not reduce SMP sufficiently 
to require any guaranteed price payment, even in the medium fuel price scenario. The 
only REFIT contribution is the fixed payment, so a move to higher fuel prices does 
not change the overall REFIT cost. With high fuel prices most of the cost is due to the 
fixed payment component of the REFIT scheme, as shown in Table 8. This also 
suggests that the hedging properties of renewables are somewhat dampened by the 
REFIT scheme. 
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Table 8. REFIT costs in 2020 (€ million, 2008 currency), high fuel price 
  All on-shore  Mixed portfolio 
All-Island capacity 2000MW 6000MW   6664MW   
ROI capacity  1357MW 4071MW  On-shore 
(4094MW)
Off-shore 
(555MW) 
Wave & Tidal 
(75MW) 
Total 
REFIT capacity 825MW 3539MW  3562MW 555MW 75MW  
Fixed payment  22.8 88.0  90.0 15.8 2.1 108.0 
Guaranteed price 
payment 
- -  - 60.5 22.0 82.6 
Total 22.8 88.0  90.0 76.4 24.2 190.6 
Total: €/MWh 
consumed  
0.74 2.87  2.94 2.50 0.79 6.23 
 
One interesting point to make here, that we will return to later, is that wave and tidal 
account less than 2 per cent of total renewable generation capacity, but are responsible 
for between 8 and 13 per cent of the total PSO cost. They receive an average yearly 
payment per MW of installed capacity equal to €385 thousand when fuel prices are 
high, €345 thousand with medium fuel prices and €322 thousand when fuel prices are 
low. 
 
We have shown how different levels of renewable energy influence the REFIT 
payment. In the following paragraphs we discuss how the REFIT payments affect 
consumer prices. We compare the size of REFIT per MWh consumed with the 
wholesale cost of electricity.  
 
The gross wholesale price is composed of the System Marginal Price (SMP), capacity 
payments, possible constraint payments, plus uplift and balancing costs. We do not 
model the uplift and balancing payments, but assume that they will average €8 per 
MWh (see MMU, 2009). The constraint payment here refers to payment given to 
renewables (wind and wave) if they are curtailed, and to thermal plants should they be 
constrained on to avoid cycling. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the REFIT payment is eventually funded by consumers through 
the PSO payment. The PSO payment is calculated here as the total REFIT payment 
divided by the amount of MWhs consumed during the year. This closely 
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approximates the actual calculation of the PSO, which apportions a slightly higher 
share of REFIT costs to the residential sector and a slightly smaller one to the non-
residential sector. 
 
Table 9. 2020 average wholesale electricity price (all island) €/MWh, 2008 currency. 
 All on-shore (4071MW, of which 3539MW REFIT) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 45.1 56.8 64.0 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
15.0 18.7 17.5 
Uplift and balancing costs 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Total gross wholesale 68.1 83.5 89.5 
REFIT PSO 6.90 4.25 2.87 
PSO as % gross wholesale 9.8% 5.1% 3.2% 
 
Table 9 analyses the size of PSO payments with respect to the average yearly gross 
wholesale price for 2020 when there are 6000MW of on-shore wind on the island as a 
whole and 4071MW of on-shore wind in the Republic of Ireland.  
 
Table 9 shows that as the fuel prices increase, the cost of REFIT decreases, as 
expected. When moving from low to medium fuel price, the price of natural gas (the 
fuel that is most important in the Irish electricity system) increases by 53 per cent and 
the PSO cost decreases by about 48 per cent. When moving from medium to high fuel 
price the cost of natural gas increases by 23 per cent and total PSO cost decreases by 
about 37 per cent. We don’t expect the cost of the PSO to decrease linearly with the 
increase in fuel costs for several reasons. First of all, the electricity half hourly cost is 
determined by the merit order and this involves a calculation that is inherently non-
linear. Second, the REFIT scheme itself is non-linear due to the fixed payment 
component. The last row of Table 9 measures the size of the PSO relative to 
wholesale costs. When fuel prices are low the PSO is 9.8 per cent of gross wholesale 
prices. This decreases to 5.1 per cent with medium fuel prices and 3.2 per cent with 
low fuel prices. 
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Table 10. 2020 average wholesale electricity price (all island) €/MWh, 2008 currency. 
 All on-shore (1357MW, of which 825MW REFIT) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 46.4 59.8 69.1 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
16.0 19.5 17.4 
Uplift and balancing costs 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Total wholesale 70.5 87.4 94.5 
REFIT PSO 1.61 0.74 0.74 
PSO as % gross wholesale 2.3% 0.9% 0.8% 
  
Table 10 describes the size of the PSO payment in the scenario with 2000MW of 
wind on the island (and 1357 MW in the Republic of Ireland). The size of the PSO 
payment decreases as expected. The PSO is between 0.8 per cent of gross wholesale 
cost (high fuel price) and 2.3 per cent (low fuel price). 
 
Table 11 shows that PSO costs increases when the renewables are both on-shore and 
off-shore. This is hardly surprising given the higher guaranteed payments to off-shore 
renewable. For this scenario, the PSO is between 6.8 per cent and 17.2 per cent of the 
gross wholesale price, depending on the fuel price level.  
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Table 11. 2020 average wholesale electricity price (all island) €/MWh, 2008 currency. 
 Mixed portfolio 
(on-shore, off-shore wind, wave and tidal) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 44.3 57.4 65.9 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
14.8 18.8 18.0 
Uplift and balancing costs 8.0 8.0 8.0 
Total gross wholesale 67.1 84.2 91.9 
REFIT PSO 11.55 6.70 6.23 
PSO as % gross wholesale 17.2% 8.0% 6.8% 
 
The absolute size of the scheme might be politically relevant, in part due to the 
current financial constraints facing Ireland. The appendix includes the detailed 
breakdown of the calculation of total wholesale costs and how they compare to total 
REFIT costs. Table 12 summarises the overall cost of REFIT for all scenarios. 
Table 12 also allows us to compare the PSO costs of an on-shore only portfolio with a 
similar portfolio including off-shore wind, wave and tidal generation. The move to a 
mixed portfolio results in an increase in the PSO cost of 67 per cent when fuel prices 
are low, 58 per cent with medium fuel prices and 117 per cent with high fuel prices. 
This is due to the much higher guaranteed price for off-shore and wave generators.  
 
The large relative increase in the PSO when moving to more off-shore renewable 
generation does, however, cause a few concerns. If off-shore wind is successful and 
adopted at high rates, it will become quite expensive for the final consumer. This is 
before accounting for the cost of undersea cables, necessary to connect off-shore 
resources to the main grid. There are no consensus estimates for the cost of off-shore 
cables, but they are likely to be much larger than on-shore cables. Wave and tidal are 
not mature technologies. They have not been deployed at a large commercial scale 
yet. The results presented in Table 11 show that sustaining these technologies through 
REFIT has a relatively large impact on consumers. At the same time the REFIT 
payment is unlikely to foster the development of this technology. For each MW of 
installed wave or tidal renewable generation, companies receive €322 thousand to 
20 
 
€385 thousand per year from REFIT, as discussed above. For comparison, the Wave 
Hub project in Cornwall (UK) has cost up to now about £42 million (about €48 
million at current exchange rates) for a capacity of 20MW.10 In general, tying funding 
to generation is not optimal at the development phase of a technology, since the trial 
projects are going to produce very little electricity.  
  
Table 12. REFIT PSO total payment in 2020, €, 2008 currency. 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
All on-shore  
(1357 MW, of which 825MW 
REFIT) 
49m 23m 23m 
All on-shore  
(4071 MW, of which 3539MW 
REFIT) 
211m 130m 88m 
Mixed portfolio 
(on-shore and off-shore wind, 
wave and tidal – 4724 MW, of 
which 4192MW REFIT) 
 
354m 205m 191m 
 
 
It would be interesting to measure how REFIT affects final retail prices, but that is 
beyond the scope of the current paper. It would involve estimating the costs of the 
additional electricity transmission and distribution lines needed to accommodate the 
amount of renewable in each scenario and the size of the retail margin.11 The cost of 
undersea cables needed to connect off-shore wind farms, wave and tidal generation to 
the grid is undoubtedly large, but still uncertain. There is also uncertainty on the size 
of the retail margin in Ireland, which will depend on the number of players in the 
retail sector and on its level of regulation, issues that are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
 
We can however measure the historic relation between wholesale and final retail 
prices. In Ireland in 2008 wholesale costs (including capacity payments, uplift and 
dispatch balancing costs) accounted for slightly less than 60 per cent of the final 
                                                 
10 Numbers reported in www.oceanpowermagazine.net/2010/11/05/wave-hub-%E2%80%98plugged-
in%E2%80%99-and-open-for-business/ 
11 The retail margin is added to the wholesale cost of electricity by the company that provides the 
electricity meters and the billing services.  
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residential cost of electricity and about 80 per cent of the final industrial cost in the 
Republic of Ireland.12 
 
Using these wholesale to retail price shares and the size of the PSO measured in the 
presence of a mixed renewable portfolio as shown in Table 11, the PSO would be 
between 4.1 per cent and 10.3 per cent of the final retail electricity price for the 
residential sector and between 5.4 per cent and 13.7 per cent for industry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have estimated the cost of REFIT, the Irish renewables support 
scheme, for the year 2020. We have compared the cost of REFIT for three levels of 
renewable generation. Fuel prices are historically very volatile, so we have also 
evaluated the sensitivity of the results to different fuel price levels. 
 
The REFIT payment to renewable generation includes a fixed component and a 
minimum price guarantee. The fixed component is paid any time generators produce 
electricity and is independent of the return that generators achieve on the market. The 
guaranteed price component is only paid if the generators do not receive a high 
enough price (i.e. the guaranteed price level) on the market. 
 
A few studies have shown that wind generation may have hedging qualities. When 
fuel prices are high, wind generation dampens the price of electricity. When fuel 
prices are low, the price of electricity is going to be a bit larger when more wind is on 
the system (if the capital costs of wind are to be covered). This is true in this study as 
well. The REFIT scheme, however, dampens the hedging qualities of wind slightly, 
due to the presence of fixed payments. Fixed payments essentially increase the cost of 
renewables on the system independent of the price of conventional fuels. 
 
Adding more wind to the electricity system is not costless. The introduction of large 
amounts of intermittent generating capacity on the Irish system imposes costs in the 
form of curtailing wind generators at times where too much wind energy would be 
                                                 
12 Final industrial and residential costs for the Republic of Ireland come from IEA (2009). The estimate 
of the cost of electricity in the SEM is reported in MMU (2009). 
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generated to allow a stable system and also of more fluctuations in the output of 
conventional thermal plants. Increasing wind generation also increases the need for 
more transmission and distribution lines. Moreover, if there is a lot of wind on the 
system the price of electricity will be lower when the wind blows. This means that 
returns to wind generators will get lower as more wind generation is established. We 
take into account the curtailment costs of wind in this study, but not the costs of 
transmission and distribution and the effects of lower electricity prices on wind 
generators’ returns to investment. In general, this means that as more windfarms are 
connected to the grid they will decrease the average generation (and returns) of 
previously existing windfarms. This is what is normally referred to as a ‘negative 
externality’. Each single windfarm will therefore have a higher incentive to start 
producing than the benefit it brings to the system as a whole 
 
We find that when there are only 2000MW of wind on the All-Island system, the price 
of REFIT is fairly small, between 0.8 per cent and 2.3 per cent of the wholesale 
electricity price. When there are 6000MW of wind, a level that is consistent with 
reaching the goal of meeting 40 per cent of electricity demand through renewables, 
REFIT costs between 3.2 per cent and 9.8 per cent of the gross wholesale price. It is 
important to note that the wholesale price itself decreases with more renewables, by 
about 5 per cent when fuel prices are high. These costs are approximately between 2 
per cent and 6 per cent of residential retail prices. They are between 2.5 per cent and 8 
per cent of business retail prices, since the wholesale price of electricity is a larger 
share of the final retail price for businesses than for residential customers. Note that 
we expect transmission and distribution costs to also increase in 2020, and the costs 
will be higher the more renewables are on the system. As mentioned above, we do not 
estimate the cost of additional distribution and transmission lines in this study 
 
Combining on-shore, off-shore, wave and tidal generation significantly increases 
REFIT costs over an on-shore only portfolio. The analysis in this paper excluded the 
costs of reinforcing and expanding the transmission and distribution grid. There are 
no consensus estimates for the cost of off-shore cables, but they are likely to be much 
larger than on-shore cables, further increasing the differences between the on-shore 
and the off-shore scenarios. 
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We argue therefore that if Ireland is able to meet its renewables obligations using only 
on-shore wind, it is the least costly solution for final consumers. If, on the other hand, 
on-shore wind will not deliver enough capacity to meet the State’s international 
obligations, there will be a need to turn to off-shore sources of electricity. 
 
In general, if off-shore wind is deployed widely, its costs are going to be high for the 
Irish consumer. At the same time, it appears unlikely that the electricity system will 
be able to accommodate much additional off-shore wind at low cost. There has been 
much discussion recently of developing Ireland’s off-shore electricity resources for 
export. This may well be optimal from a European (and specifically UK) point of 
view, if it is cheaper to develop these resources in Ireland than in the UK. However, it 
is clear that Irish consumers should not be called to fund and guarantee this business 
venture. 
 
For wave and tidal, the usefulness of a REFIT scheme is even less clear. Those 
technologies are not at a deployment level yet. This means that a scheme such as 
REFIT is not sufficient to encourage research and development in the area. Instead, a 
competitive process of research grants should be set up to fund this type of 
development. A competitive grant scheme would allow more research and not weigh 
too heavily on consumers and businesses. It would also have the advantage of capping 
liabilities for the taxpayers (or consumers) who are ultimately going to fund it. 
 
Finally, the fixed portion of the REFIT payment is a pure subsidy, not linked to 
market conditions. As it is set up, this element of the REFIT scheme dampens the 
hedging quality of wind generation and adds to the cost to final consumers. It should 
therefore be eliminated, leaving REFIT as a pure price guarantee scheme.
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1. 2020 total wholesale electricity price (ROI), €, 2008 currency 
 All on-shore (4071MW, of which 3539MW REFIT) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 1379m 1739m 1959m 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
460m 573m 537m 
Uplift and balancing costs 
(12.8% of SMP) 
245m 245m 245m 
Total gross wholesale 2084m 2557m 2741m 
REFIT PSO 211m 130m 88m 
 
 
 
Table A.2. 2020 total wholesale electricity price (ROI), €, 2008 currency. 
 All on-shore (1357MW, of which 825MW REFIT) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 1422m 1832m 2116m 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
490m 598m 531m 
Uplift and balancing costs 
(12.8% of SMP) 
245m 245m 245m 
Total wholesale 2157m 2674m 2892m 
REFIT PSO 49m 23m 23m 
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Table A.3. 2020 total wholesale electricity price (ROI), €, 2008 currency. 
 Mixed portfolio 
(on-shore, off-shore wind, wave and tidal) 
 
  Low fuel price Med. fuel price High fuel price 
SMP 1355m 1757m 2018m 
Capacity & Constraint 
payments 
454m 575m 552m 
Uplift and balancing costs 
(12.8% of SMP) 
245m 245m 245m 
Total gross wholesale 2054m 2577m 2815m 
REFIT PSO 354m 205m 191m 
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